Images of a handcuffed Nicolás Maduro being escorted to a detention center in Brooklyn will be uncomfortable for political leaders in Havana.
“Cuba is going to be something we end up talking about,” President Donald Trump said a few hours after the January 3, 2026 operation to capture the Venezuelan president. Secretary of State Marco Rubio echoed Trump’s warning: “If I lived in Havana and was in government, I would be worried.”
As a historian of the United States and Cuba, I believe that Washington’s relations with Havana have entered a new phase under the Trump administration. Barack Obama’s “Cuban Thaw” and Joe Biden’s less restrictive sanctions have disappeared. Instead, the Trump administration has apparently adopted a policy of regime change through maximum pressure.
If the administration has its way, 2026 will be the last year of communist rule in Cuba, and it intends to achieve it without intervention from the US military.
“I don’t think we need to (take) any action,” Trump said on Jan. 4, adding: “Cuba looks like it’s about to fall.”
Cuba’s friend with benefits
Trump may be right. Maduro’s capture has effectively taken away Cuba’s closest ally.
Maduro’s predecessor and mentor, Hugo Chávez, was an avowed admirer of Cuban revolutionary leader Fidel Castro.
Shortly after taking power in 1999, the Chávez government began supplying oil on favorable terms to Cuba in exchange for doctors and, eventually, training of Venezuelan security forces. It was no coincidence that 32 of the security agents killed while defending Maduro from approaching US forces were Cuban.
Maduro succeeded Chávez as president in 2013 and continued the country’s support for Cuba. In 2022, a member of the Venezuelan opposition claimed that Caracas contributed US$60 billion to the Cuban economy between 2002 and 2022.
Maduro’s generosity proved unsustainable. In the early 2010s, Venezuela entered a serious economic crisis caused by economic mismanagement, over-reliance on oil, and US sanctions.
Venezuela’s support for Cuba slowed to a trickle in 2016. However, the Maduro government has continued to secretly supply Cuba with oil, while evading US sanctions, at quantities far below Cuba’s needs.
Difficult times in Cuba
Venezuela’s penury and American pressure mean Cubans are now experiencing deprivation at a level not seen since the country’s “special period” of economic crisis from 1991 to 1995, brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bloc’s generous subsidies.
Since 2020, Cuba’s GDP has dropped by 11%, while the value of the Cuban peso continues to fall.
Cubans no longer have reliable electricity or access to water. Mosquito-borne diseases, once rare, are now widespread because the government cannot afford to spray pesticides.
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The medical system only provides the most basic care, and hospitals have little to no medicine.
Meanwhile, industrial and agricultural production has declined sharply, as have food imports.
And although famine has not yet emerged, food insecurity has increased, with most Cubans eating a limited diet and skipping meals. Street crime has also become common on Cuba’s once safe streets.
Since Maduro’s takeover, the US administration has outlined policies that appear destined to increase economic pressure on the Cuban economy and bring about regime change. For example, the United States has made clear that it will no longer allow Venezuela to supply oil to Cuba.
Apparently, the administration hopes that, without oil, the Cuban government will simply collapse. Or perhaps Trump hopes that Cubans, frustrated as they may be, will overthrow their communist masters without U.S. help.
A regime without popular support
In any case, there is a possible flaw in the administration’s reasoning: Cuban communists have survived crises like this for more than 60 years. However, there is evidence that as the Cuban economy declines, so does support for the regime.
Since 2020, more than a million Cubans have left the country, mainly for the United States and Spanish-speaking countries. A Cuban colleague of mine with access to government research recently told me that the figure is close to 2 million.
Those who stayed are no more satisfied.
In a 2024 public opinion poll, an overwhelming majority of Cubans expressed deep dissatisfaction with the Cuban Communist Party and the leadership of President Miguel Díaz-Canel.
Cubans have also taken their complaints to the streets. In July 2021, protests broke out across Cuba, demanding more freedom and a better standard of living. The government quickly imprisoned the protesters and sentenced them to long prison terms.
However, sporadic protests have continued, often quickly and without warning, prompting harsh repression. In particular, the San Isidro movement, formed in 2018 to protest restrictions on artistic expression, has strong support among young Cubans.
Changes in attitudes toward the United States
As Cubans have turned against their government, they have become more receptive to the United States.
During my first visit in 1996, Cubans blamed the US embargo in place since the early 1960s for the deprivations they suffered during the Special Period.
However, in the last decade I have heard Cubans—at least those under 50—express more anger with their government than with the US embargo.
Make no mistake: Cubans want the US embargo to end. But they no longer believe in their government’s attempt to blame Washington for all of Cuba’s economic and political problems.
Part of this change is due to the extraordinary emigration of Cubans: all the Cubans I know have a family member or friend in the United States. The Internet has also helped; Cubans can now read foreign news sources on their smartphones.
Welcome, liberators?
Since Maduro’s capture, I have sent messages to friends in Cuba to get the feeling. All but one of the six Cuban friends I managed to contact told me that they were receptive to US intervention in Cuba, as long as it eliminated the regime that was making their lives miserable.
A friend said, “If the Yankees showed up today, most of us would probably welcome them as liberators.”
I recognize that my sample is small. But such reactions, coming from comparatively elite Cubans working in both the private and public sectors, cannot be good news for what remains of the Castro regime.
*Joseph J. Gonzalez is Associate Professor of Global Studies at Appalachian State University.
This text was originally published on The Conversation.