How the Trump administration tried to sell Ukraine on a diplomatic disaster

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A recent diplomatic frenzy has led to the emergence of two competing peace plans for Ukraine.

The first, widely touted as a US plan, was apparently negotiated between Kremlin insider Kirill Dmitriev and Steve Witkoff, President Donald Trump’s point man in Russia.

The second, hastily drafted by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, is based on the 28 points of the American plan, but with key modifications and deletions.

Following the release of the US plan, Trump accused Ukraine of showing “zero gratitude” for US help in the war effort and demanded that kyiv agree to the terms by the US Thanksgiving Day (November 27) or face exclusion from US intelligence sharing and military aid.

Unlike the American plan, the European counterproposal places blame for the war squarely on Russia. He proposes freezing Russian assets until Moscow pays reparations. It also seeks to freeze the conflict, leaving the question of which side retains which part of Ukraine to later negotiations.

Speaking about the peace proposals, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made clear that the European Union was committed to several key positions:

  • That Ukraine’s borders cannot be altered by force;
  • That there can be no limitations on the Ukrainian armed forces that make it vulnerable; and
  • That the EU must participate in any agreement.

Comparing the two plans, it is evident that Russia and Europe remain as far apart as ever over the future of Ukraine. This is not surprising.

What should be most shocking to Western observers is the extent to which the US plan echoes Russian demands, which have remained largely unchanged since President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022.

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Lack of logic and specificity

In short, the American plan would have had the same credibility if it had been written in pencil.

For starters, your writing seems to make more sense in Russian than in English (or perhaps in AI-translated English).

And he appears more focused on ushering in a new era of friendly economic cooperation between Russia and the United States than on a serious attempt to resolve Europe’s biggest land war since World War II.

Typical of Trump’s foreign policy, the document provided for large appropriations of funds for the United States, which were nothing more than extortion attempts.

In exchange, Ukraine was offered a shady NATO-style security guarantee, which could be reneged on flimsy pretexts.

The plan also called for:

  • Large territorial concessions from kyiv.
  • A limited army.
  • A promise enshrined in the Ukrainian Constitution to never join NATO and a promise to hold elections within 100 days.
  • And while it expected Ukraine to strategically self-destruct, the document only made vague suggestions about what Russia is “expected” to do, with no mechanism to enforce it.

No multinational force was sent to oversee the peace. And Ukraine was forced to give up key defensive positions, ceding to Russia the territory it still controls in the Donbas region. This would leave the center of the country defenseless against future Russian attacks.

Accepting those terms, as originally drafted, would be politically suicidal for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. This was made clear in his somber message, in which he stated that the plan forced Ukraine to choose between its dignity and continued American support.

A detailed analysis of the key points of the agreement for Ukraine

A closer look at some of its key points illustrates the strangeness of the plan.

Point 4 requires “dialogue” between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States. This is strange, since the United States is a member of NATO.

Point 7 requires that NATO include a provision in its statutes stating that Ukraine will not be admitted. But NATO’s main goal is for membership to be open to all.

Point 9 indicates that “European fighter jets” will be stationed in Poland, but does not mention the American F-35s currently there.

Point 10 states that if Ukraine launches a missile “for no reason” against St. Petersburg or Moscow (which curiously implies that it is okay to attack Smolensk or Voronezh, for example), kyiv loses the American security guarantee.

Point 13 states that Russia will be invited to rejoin the G8 (the group now known as the G7 following its expulsion in 2014). However, it does not specify whether the other six members would agree.

Point 16 requires Russia to enshrine in law a policy of non-aggression towards Ukraine. However, he had done so several times in the past, and still invaded Ukraine in 2022.

Point 22 provides for a demilitarized zone in parts of Donetsk that Russian troops will not be able to enter. It is not specified how it will be implemented.

Point 26 grants all those involved in the conflict full amnesty for their actions, including numerous alleged war criminals.

Point 27 establishes a “Peace Council” overseen by Trump, similar to the “Peace Board” envisioned in the Gaza peace plan, also chaired by Trump. This gives you the power to determine whether the agreement is being violated (and, crucially, by whom).

Also read: Zelensky receives the US plan to end the war in Ukraine and hopes to speak with Trump

And now what?

Ukrainians have already been sold diplomatic lemonade. In 1994, Ukraine signed the Budapest Memorandum, in which kyiv agreed to give up the nuclear weapons it still had from the Soviet era, in exchange for Russia and the United States’ commitment to respect its sovereignty and borders.

Just as kyiv has rejected the current US plan, there is no hope that Putin’s regime will back the European alternative. In fact, it has already been rejected by one of its main advisors.

Where does this leave the peace process? US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has already reduced the US plan from a concrete set of demands to a “living document” and hinted at major progress in negotiations with Ukraine.

European and Ukrainian stakeholders also expressed their approval, knowing that if the White House loses interest, securing peace will be much more difficult.

However, it is beneath the surface where the real introspection will occur, both in Ukraine and in the West in general. Once again, the Trump administration has demonstrated that it is more interested in long-term deals with autocrats than in achieving just and lasting solutions to security crises.

This alone should give America’s allies pause, and not just in Europe. For those nations, it is one thing to doubt Putin’s motives. But it is quite another to have to now also doubt those of the United States.

*Matthew Sussex is an associate and adjunct professor at the Griffith Asia Institute; and a member of the Center for Strategic and Defense Studies at the Australian National University.

This text was originally published in The Conversation

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