The ongoing debate on whether Iranian nuclear facilities were “destroyed”, as the US president and his team, or simply “damaged” insist, as suggests much of intelligence information, should make us reflect on the nature and purpose of intelligence.
As Donald Rumsfeld said: “If it were a fact, it would not be called intelligence.”
The registered destination of Iranian nuclear facilities will be decided by collecting and evaluation of raw intelligence information, difficult to access. This will include images, technical, communications and human intelligence, among many secret techniques.
It is unlikely that the classified conclusions of these efforts will be made public, unless an investigation of the Congress or the Senate is carried out, such as that carried out after 11-S.
So why is it important?
There has been a great public interest in intelligence evaluations since 11-S and Iraq invasion of 2003. Intelligence often only becomes public when something goes wrong, either because something was overlooked or because the public was deceived. Research on 11-S criticized intelligence agencies for not integrating individual data into a complete panorama, revealing conspiracy and attack.
Research on the 2003 Iraq war approach suggested that intelligence agencies had allowed their evaluations to be influenced by political need or that they had not properly noticed what they did not know.
The success of intelligence operations almost always implies the prevention of something harmful to the country or the population. If the agencies celebrated these successes with enthusiasm, they could reveal useful information about their techniques and scope for our adversaries. Therefore, our understanding of intelligence tends to be influenced by popular culture or research on intelligence failures.
From these two sources, intelligence is both omniscient and deeply defective. If we add to this the narratives around the “deep state” – an abbreviated form that accuses anonymous and publicly irresponsible government officials of frustrating the popular will – should not surprise that the public and politicians sometimes feel confused regarding security intelligence and published evaluations.
In the case of Iranian nuclear facilities, the importance of the intelligence panorama focuses on politics, diplomacy and security. Donald Trump, obviously, would prefer an official narrative to affirm that his decision and orders delayed years of the Iranian nuclear program. That is why he talks about the destruction of the facilities. And that is why its director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, said that her intelligence -based evaluation coincides. However, he chose not to testify to the Senate.
In diplomatic matters, the opinion of intelligence officials could have two consequences: to harm Iran’s negotiating position, lacking a nuclear program that provides maximum security; or allow Tehran to present to the country as an emerging nuclear power, with the additional power that this implies. This opinion will influence Israel’s need to contain Iran preventively. And in terms of security, the classified opinion will also help define the next steps of the US president, his diplomats and his armed forces.
Public evaluation can be different from what is carried out within the government. While it is uncomfortable for us outside government circles, this is usually a perfectly reasonable decision for a government. Security diplomacy develops better behind closed doors. Or at least, it used to be. Now Trump seems to be reinventing the art of the state in public with his publications in Truthsocial and his simple and authentic language in press conferences.
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Misinformation and public distrust of US intelligence
A big difference between the secret intelligence evaluation and publicly recognized position may have serious consequences for a government. The papers of the Pentagon of 1971 are a good example of this.
These documents, prepared for the Government on the progress of the Vietnam War, were leaked to the press. The leaks highlighted the inaccuracy of government reports to the American public about the progress of war. The consequences included several official investigations that threw a negative light on intelligence agencies. They also resulted in a strengthening of press freedom.
Similarly, the 2003 Iraq war damaged the credibility of the American intelligence community. It was clear that unequivocal statements about Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction were exaggerated and lacking. The loss of trust, the limitations in the executive use of intelligence and losses of lives and resources for the United States in the Iraq campaign still feel in American politics.
Finally, 2013 Snowden leaks highlighted the discrepancy between what was understood about the intrusion of intelligence in private communications data, including Internet navigation activities, and what happened in the National Security Agency (NSA) through programs such as Prism.
Snowden’s leaks affected the image of the United States before their allies and gave rise to the US Freedom Law in 2015. This imposed certain limitations to the data that US intelligence agencies can collect on US citizens and also clarified the use of telephone listeners and the monitoring of solitary terrorists.
The Snowden case also fed an increasing narrative about the irresponsible activity of the deep state, which has put online phenomena as the Qanon conspiracion website. In addition, it has promoted certain populist policies that point to and feed public suspicion on mass surveillance and hidden government activities.
The lessons of the current debate are clear. The first is that using intelligence evaluations to justify military actions entails persistent risks for governments, given the propensity of public officials to filter information.
From there it follows that when it is demonstrated that published intelligence is incorrect, the unforeseen consequence for governments is a loss of trust and less freedom to use intelligence in order to protect the national state.
*Robert Dover He is a professor of National Intelligence and Security and Dean of the Faculty of the University of Hull.
This article was originally published in The Conversation
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