Despite public support in the United States for overthrowing Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, President Donald Trump likely will not find that same level of support to wage a real war in that country.
Even as Trump attempts to work with Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president and now the country’s interim leader, to manage Venezuela, echoes of President George W. Bush are being heard in Iraq, with Trump saying that the United States will “rule” Venezuela and “bring it back to health” with Venezuelan oil wealth. However, all of this — which requires significant Washington control and a presence on the ground — cannot or will not happen without a significant commitment of US military forces, something Trump did not rule out.
“We are not afraid to put troops on the ground,” Trump said.
However, American citizens were and remain deeply skeptical of military action in Venezuela. From Lyndon Johnson to George W. Bush, history shows that leaders often pay a high political price, and legacy costs, when the wars they start or expand become unpopular.
As an expert on US foreign policy and regime change wars, my research shows that every major US war since 1900, especially those involving regime change, was initially backed by a great story with a great purpose or objective. This helped galvanize national support for bearing the costs of these wars.
During the Cold War, a story about the dangers of Soviet power to American democracy and the need to combat the spread of communism generated strong public support, at least initially, for the wars in Korea and Vietnam, along with smaller operations in the Caribbean and Latin America.
In the 2000s and 2010s, the dominant narrative about preventing another 9/11 and combating global terrorism generated strong initial public support for the wars in Iraq (70% in 2003) and Afghanistan (88% in 2001).
A big problem Trump faces now is that there is no similar story for Venezuela.
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What national interest?
The administration’s justifications for the war cover a mix of reasons, such as stopping drugs flowing almost exclusively to Europe, not the US; seize oil fields that benefit US corporations, but not the general public; and somehow slow down China’s efforts to build roads and bridges in Latin America.
All of these reasons are unrelated to any sense of story-driven collective mission or purpose. Unlike Korea or Afghanistan at the beginning, Americans don’t know what the war in Venezuela will bring them or whether it is worth the costs.
This lack of a holistic story or broad rationale is reflected in the surveys. In November, only 15% of Americans viewed Venezuela as a national emergency. A plurality, 45%, opposed overthrowing Maduro. After Maduro was removed in early January 2026, Americans’ opposition to the use of force in Venezuela rose to 52%. There is no wave of patriotic support here.
Americans also worry about where things are headed in Venezuela, with 72% saying Trump has not clearly explained future plans. Few want the responsibility of a regime change. Nine out of ten say Venezuelans, not the US, should choose their next government. And more than 60% oppose additional use of force against Venezuela or other Latin American countries.
Only 43% of Republicans want the United States to dominate the Western Hemisphere, indicating that Trump’s foreign policy vision is not even popular in his own party.
Overall, these numbers stand in stark contrast to past US wars backed by great stories, where there was usually a deep, bipartisan consensus behind the use of force.
At the moment, 89% of Republicans support the elimination of Maduro. But 87% of Democrats and 58% of independents oppose it.
Reflecting national skepticism — and in a rejection of Trump — the US Senate advanced a measure requiring Trump to obtain congressional approval before taking further military action in Venezuela. Five Senate Republicans joined all Democratic senators in voting for the measure.
In summary, the US political system is showing warning signs regarding the war in Venezuela.
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Arrogance can turn deadly
Research shows that US regime change wars almost never go as planned. However, the arrogance of American leaders sometimes causes them to ignore this fact, which can result in deadly problems. In Iraq, the influential Vice President Dick Cheney told an interviewer: “We will be welcomed as liberators.” We were not, and US forces became bogged down in a bloody insurgent war.
Experts say the same problem could occur in Venezuela.
What could stop the US from entering into a deeper war that is not in line with how the public views US interests? My research shows that the answer lies in American leaders taking steps to move away from taking responsibility for what happens next in Venezuela.
This largely depends on presidential rhetoric. When leaders make robust commitments to action, they often find themselves politically trapped later in following through, even if they don’t want to. Their words create what political scientists call “audience costs,” which are internal political setbacks or punishments that leaders face if they don’t follow through with what they promised to do.
Audience costs can even form in a case like Venezuela, because despite limited support for the use of force, the media, along with war advocates inside and outside the government, often pick up a president’s words and produce an agitated conversation. That conversation is visible now in the news cycle, with top Republicans and other prominent voices calling for stronger action. It’s the “if you broke it, you fix it” discussion.
This whirlwind raises questions about the president’s credibility, sometimes leaving leaders feeling trapped into acting even when public support is questionable.
As a presidential candidate in 2008, Barack Obama promised to devote more attention and resources to the war in Afghanistan. When he took office, Obama’s words took their toll. The political pressure generated by his campaign promise made it almost impossible for Obama to avoid sending troops to Afghanistan at a much larger level than he had planned.
Although presidents should always strive to keep the public informed about policy direction, research shows that leaders can avoid the audience cost trap by remaining relatively vague and noncommittal, which the public prefers now, about future military actions.
In the case of Venezuela, Trump has already done some of this work with vague language, avoiding details about when and if force will be used again, and also downplaying talk about US-led democracy promotion. If he stops talking about “governing” Venezuela and adopts more measured language used by advisers such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who says the goal is to “move (Venezuela) in a certain direction,” but not govern the country, Trump could take another step to avoid feeling trapped in doing more. militarily.
Events on the ground in Venezuela could also influence future US policy. Obama would not have faced the political pressure for the troop surge that he experienced upon coming to office if the war in Afghanistan had gone in a more positive direction.
Venezuela is close to economic collapse, according to some experts, due to Caracas’ inability to take advantage of profits from selling oil abroad. If that happens, political chaos could ensue and leave Trump, like Obama in Afghanistan, feeling a lot of pressure to act militarily, especially if Trump continues to say that he “rules” Venezuela.
Again, Americans don’t like that idea, which means that taking steps, such as easing the current oil embargo, to ease the economic pain in Venezuela could make sense for Trump. Otherwise, if Trump sends in American troops and deaths rise, even a president considered virtually untouchable by scandal and failure could ultimately find himself paying a political price for his decisions.
This article was originally published by The Conversation
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