If the purpose of a rare joint appearance of the leaders of Russia, North Korea and China on September 3, 2025 was to encourage unity among allies, then the first indicators suggest that it is already working, only in other places.
Two days after the trio met in Beijing, Japan and Australia agreed to strengthen security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Then, on September 11, an agreement between Japan and the Philippines, which allows the armed forces of both nations to operate in the territories of the other. Such agreements represent a sample of unity of the countries of the Pacific region against perceived Chinese assertiveness.
The placement of Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong one next to President Xi Jinping in high profile commemorations that mark the 80th anniversary of China’s victory over Japan in World War II was deliberate. Beijing was communicating solidarity and alignment between the three countries against the West. The Western media interpreted this moment as Beijing’s intention, warning of a new international order focused on China.
But as a security expert of the Northeast Asian and China’s great strategy, I believe that events highlight a real danger to Beijing that their approach can be creating new challenges and risks. Ror it to XI strategically, forcing him to approach two unpredictable actors on the northeast borders of China, while undermining any statement that Beijing is an alternative and neutral global mediator. Above all, it could further damage the fragile relations of China with Europe and the countries of Asia.
And none of this will benefit China.
The awkward XI position on Ukraine
Without a doubt, the forge of narrower ties by China with two states that much of the world sees as Parias has not emerged from nothing. It follows years of growing tensions between China and the West.
The War in Ukraine was one of the main reasons behind the recent deterioration of relations between China and Europe, although Beijing affirms for a long time its neutrality in the conflict and asks for peace conversations.
Earlier this year, China pointed out its discontent with Pyongyang for getting too close to Moscow and making military aid to Russia more and more public.
Xi’s highly visible appearance with Putin and Kim could now undermine those positions and place the Chinese president in a somewhat uncomfortable position: it gives the impression that Beijing accepts the association between Russia and North Korea and its war effort in Ukraine.
Approach between the EU and the United States
In Brussels, the head of foreign policy of the European Union (EU), Kaja Kallas, warned that the participation of Chinese, Russian, Iranian and North Korean leaders in the Beijing parade represented an “authoritarian alliance” that defies the so -called international order based on rules.
In this context, it is likely that China’s alignment with Russia and North Korea deepens the security concerns of Europe and even more tensioning the tense economic relations between China and the EU.
It could push the EU to expand anti -dumping measures against China or accelerate efforts to reduce Beijing’s economic dependence. And this could harm the economy somewhat slow in China: in 2024, China was the largest source of imports in the European Union, with a trade that amounted to 609,000 million dollars, while the EU remained as the second largest export market in China.
Ironically, while the policies of the second mandate of the president of the United States, Donald Trump, such as courting Putin and promoting an agenda of “United States first”, undermined the traditional transatlantic alliance, the growing alignment between China, Russia and North Korea can have the opposite effect: to boost Trump to embrace Europe and strengthen cooperation with their allies to counter the new block.
It was remarkable that on September 4, one day after Beijing’s parade, Trump urged European leaders to increase economic pressure on China and accused Beijing of financing the Russian war in Ukraine. The European Commission was already willing to follow this path, since it recently announced that it is weighing whether to include several independent Chinese refineries in its last round of sanctions against Russia.
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Hardening posture in South Korea
The alignment of China, Russia and North Korea also runs the risk of promoting a tendency to which Beijing has previously resisted: a containment strategy of China forged through Anti-Beijing alliances throughout the Pacific.
We already have an increase in naval exercises between the United States and the Philippines, multilateral exercises led by the United States and Indonesia and now greater defense ties between Japan and the Philippines.
It is likely that the Putin-Kim-XI alliance push Japan and South Korea, which currently have relatively moderate positions to China, to distance themselves from Beijing and further strengthen their alliances with the United States to counteract this emerging block.
On September 11, the United States and Japan began two weeks of military exercises with the Typhon intermediate range missile system, capable of attacking China’s continental part. And as of September 15, South Korea, Japan and the United States will carry out annual drills to reinforce defenses against nuclear threats and North Korea missiles.
Leaving alliances aside, Chinese politics also runs the risk of tightening internal opinion and external policies of other nations against Beijing.
In South Korea, the ruler Democratic party has favored, to date, a more friendly approach to China and North Korea, while maintaining a cautious attitude towards its alliance with the United States and relations with Japan.
This contrasts strongly with the previous government of President Yoon Suk Yeol, who followed a hard line position over China and North Korea and actively sought to reinforce trilateral cooperation with Washington and Tokyo.
The acceptance of North Korea by Beijing could now force Seoul to reconsider its policy towards China and return to a more hostile position.
China’s decision to invite Kim Jong-un, isolated and sanctioned for a long time by the international community, to the center of the stage in Beijing was widely seen as a tacit recognition of North Korea’s nuclear position.
In particular, during the XI-Kim Summit of September 5, Beijing did not mention the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a point that attracted the significant attention of the South Korean media. He contrasted with the four meetings of the couple, in which both parties expressed their support for the realization of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Chinese-Japanese relations
Japan is in a position similar to that of South Korea.
Prime Minister Shigeru ishiba recently resigned was considered a moderate pro-china within the ruling Democratic Liberal Party. Since he assumed the position in October 2024, the ishiba’s approach marked a clear deviation from his predecessor, Fumio Kishida, whose hard position on Beijing had caused a strong deterioration of Chinese-Japanese relations.
Instead, Ishhiba sought stability and met with XI at the APEC summit in Lima, Peru, in November 2024, where the two leaders agreed to work together to build a more stable and constructive association.
However, the growing security concerns caused by alignment between China, Russia and North Korea could push Japan to adopt a harder policy towards China in the future.
How the sample of unity in Beijing will be developed in Washington is an open question. Although Trump praised China’s parade as “beautiful” and “impressive”, he seemed disgusted with the joint appearance of Xi, Putin and Kim, affirming on social networks that his nations were “conspiring against” the United States.
A new international order?
Together, the September 3 parade undeniably pointed out Xi’s intention to build an international order with China in the center. He projected a strong sense of deterrence to the United States and the West, while stressing China’s dominant position within the trilateral relationship with Russia and North Korea.
However, at the same time, I believe that this high profile alignment can lead to risks: it deepens the western and regional suspicions of a “agitation axis”, threatens to tighten the foreign relations of China further and it is likely to accelerate the balance efforts against Beijing, especially through a narrower transatlantic cooperation and a strengthening of the alliance between the United States, Japan and Japan.
*Lingong Kong is a candidate for a Doctorate in Political Science at Auburn University.
This article was originally published in The Conversation
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