For many in Venezuela, the question is no longer whether tensions with Washington will reach a critical point; They already did. Rather, the great unknown now is whether the United States will follow up on threats and the sinking of drug traffickers with something more drastic: a direct military confrontation or even a regime change.
Certainly, the Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, prepares for any eventuality. On September 29, 2025, the leftist leader signed a decree that granted additional powers. The next day, Maduro threatened to declare the “state of emergency.” Caracas has already carried out military exercises, amid rumors of being a “republic in arms.”
This follows a month in which Washington positioned warships, an attack submarine and airplanes in the Caribbean and destroyed at least four alleged fast boats with drug traffickers. In the United Nations General Assembly of September 23, US President Donald Trump warned of more incidents to come, promising to eliminate drug traffickers, while reiterating his statement that Maduro was behind drug trafficking networks.
Maduro and his generals deny that accusation. However, Washington offered a reward of 50 million dollars for Maduro’s arrest and rejected Venezuela’s requests for dialogue.
As an expert in international security and relations between the United States and Latin America, I think that American position seems to be inclined towards a regime change, from a previous ambiguity position that did not reach a direct commitment to overthrow Maduro.
But Washington is aware that any direct military intervention in Venezuela will be a complex matter. Despite the growing international isolation, Maduro still has allies in Moscow and Beijing, as well as in Havana, closer to home. And these factors could force Trump’s government to maintain a delicate line between the maximum pressure on the Maduro government and a total commitment to the armed conflict.
United States intensifies pressure
The recent deployments of the EU Southern Command demonstrate a change of position by the US government.
The USS Stockdale became the ninth ship and third destroyer of the US Navy, along with the USS Serly and the USS Jasson Dunham, to join the Amphibian preparation group of the USS IWO JIMA, which performs maneuvers between Puerto Rico and the minor and cassock Antilles, as well as in waters north of Venezuela. In total, at least 4,500 marine infants and sailors are deployed in the area.
Meanwhile, it is reported that at least 10 F-35 fighters and several MQ-9 drones operate from Aguadilla and Ceiba airports in Puerto Rico, which offers the ability to perform constant surveillance and attack options.
These forces are more powerful than the entire Venezuelan Navy, but, as reported, do not reach the necessary forces for large -scale invasion.
At the moment, the South Command presents the campaign as reinforced anti -narcotics operations, instead of a prelude to a block or an invasion. The statements have highlighted joint patrols and interdiction efforts with the Royal Navy of the Netherlands, Canada, the Dominican Republic and the United Kingdom, as well as the humanitarian nature or exchange of information from the missions.
The South Command described its position as preparation, not war. However, this could change, especially with the long -awaited review of the National Defense of 2025, which is expected to prioritize the fight against the perceived threat of Chinese interference in the Western hemisphere.
And it should be remembered that the United States maintained a light but constant military presence in the region for a long time.
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Oil in the balance
A much more important factor could be China’s position.
Beijing plays a crucial role as a Venezuelan oil buyer. With the entry into force of Western sanctions, an increasing part of Venezuelan hydrocarbons exports is channeled through tank ships of the “shade fleet” and complex deviation schemes, which allows the crude to reach Chinese refineries despite the sanctions and export restrictions.
Any American campaign that interrupts these flows would first affect Chinese refineries. This would probably drive Beijing to diplomat and commercially.
At the end of September, China emphasized that it “opposes the use of force” and condemned external interference in the internal affairs of Venezuela, a clear criticism of the increase in US military presence.
The Chinese ambassador to Caracas also transmitted his solidarity to his host, highlighting that Beijing “will firmly support Venezuela in the safeguarding of sovereignty, national dignity and social stability.”
China offers diplomatic support, but has not committed to use force.
For now, I believe that the most likely strategy in the United States is coastal surveillance and military pressure. At sea, this means that the United States will continue to lead anti -narcotics operations, but with the coverage of the Navy by hand. The increase in US troops could boost clandestine networks of the opposition in Venezuela, increasing the pressure on the Maduro regime from within.
This will be combined with greater financial pressure in the form of sanctions aimed at further restricting the Venezuelan state oil industry, but calibrated to avoid a global energy crisis. Measures also include restricting dollars compensation and sea insurance, including blacklists and oils of the dark fleet, and chasing facade companies.
Pressure without war
However, the expectations of a military confrontation are increasing. Several analysts estimate that the probability of some type of American attack against Venezuela before the end of the year is approximately 1 between 3, and that the probabilities will continue to increase until 2026.
However, the possibility of a total invasion remains, in my opinion, remote. The American internal policy could act as a brake: opinion polls show that most Americans oppose military action to overthrow Maduro, and an even greater majority rejects the idea of a large -scale invasion.
Even so, three factors could determine whether Washington will intensify their actions and when it will: a deadly incident in the sea that involves US civilians or personnel; strong evidence that Venezuelan officials are directly linked to large -scale traffic to the United States; and regional governments that are aligned to support more forceful measures.
While the chances of an attack and even a regime change increases, Washington’s strategy in the very short term seems to continue to press without a total commitment, using demonstrations of strength, sanctions and selective attacks to weaken Caracas and avoid being dragged to a complicated war or cause an oil crisis.
*Robert Muggah He is a member of the Richard von Weizsäcker Felow of the Bosch Academy and co -founder of the Igarapé Institute.
This text was originally published in The Conversation
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